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2(45 words)
SOVEREIGNTY CONDmONS AND GOVERNANCE MODES: AN OPTION THEORY
APPROACH
This study extends previous work which has examined governance decisions using option
theory. In particular, it evaluates the contribution ofoption theory in both domestic and
international environments. Empirical results from a multinomiallogit model suggest that the
influence ofoption value differs across segments.
3Ifa finn is conceived ofas having a value chain ofcomplementary activities (porter, 1985),
such as research and development (R&D), production, marketing, and distribution; a central task
of:firm decision-makers is deciding which activities to source from other parties through markets
or collaboration, and which activities to bring "in-house" through acquisition or internal
development. Inspired by Coase's (1937) seminal work, The Nature ofthe Firm, this decision has
been examined using transaction cost theory by a number ofnotable scholars, including Chandler
(1962); Arrow (1975); Wtlliamson (1975, 1985); and Klien, Crawford, and Alchian (1978).
Recently, it has been discovered that transaction costs are particularly relevant when sourcing
decisions involve a firm from another country (Gatignon and Anderson, 1988; Kogut and Singh,
1988; Hennart, 1988, 1991; Gomes-Casseres, 1989). Thus, the importance oftransaction costs
has been verified in both domestic and international contexts.
Unfortunately, this previous work does not consider that sourcing decisions may alsa be
influenced by the option value associated with certain types ofgovernance. Folta (1994) and
Folta and Leiblein (1994) found that option value may offset the impact oftransaction costs.
While their work illuminates the importance ofoptions on governance choice, it fails to examine
whether option theory provides equal explanatory power to governance decisions in both
domestic and international contexts. This shortcoming is significant in that it hinders our ability to
generalize about the appropriateness of an increasingly popular tool (Kogut, 1991; Bowman and
Hurry, 1993; Sanchez, 1993). As such, this limitation is the motivation for this study.
One type of activity in the value chain is examined, R&D, and the factors which lead firms to
choose between partial equity investments in collaborative relationships versus outright
acquisition of another firm. These equity linkages include both classic joint ventures, where two
4or more parties create a separate, jointly owned entity; and direct minority investments, where one
party takes an equity position in its partner.
A sample of451 transactions from the biotechnology industry is used to address the research
question. A multinomiallogit model was specified to estimate the impact of option value on the
probability that each of the three governance structures (acquisition, minority investment, and
joint ventures) would be selected. The results suggest that the influence of option value differs
between transactions in domestic and international contexts.
CHARACTERIZING PARTIAL EQUITY INVESThffiNTS AS CALL OPTIONS ON
TECHNOLOGY
Like previous studies (Kogut, 1991; Folta, 1994; Folta and Leiblein, 1994), minority
investment and joint ventures are characterized as call options, providing the right, but not the
obligation, to acquire an innovative firm or joint venture, respectively, at a later date and a pre-
specified price. The "rights to acquire" frequently found in minority investments and joint
ventures may come in several fonns: (1) the right to buy and sell equity at a certain price; (2) the
right offirst refusal (only in joint ventures); or (3) the right to develop, market, or license
technology. These "rights" serve two functions. First, they specify the price at which the
technology or the target can be purchased in the future. 1 This allows the investing firm to
capitalize on the appreciation oft'he technology, while limiting exposure to devaluations in the
technology (because the investor need not acquire). The second function is that they may create a
1 A "'target" is defined here as a small, innovative finn which possesses the technology desired by another fum.
5proprietary opportunity for the investing finn. If rivals do not share the same opportunity, they
can not as easily pre-empt acquisition or subsequent discretionary investments.
Figure 1 helps to illustrate the option component found in equity collaborations. By securing
the right to acquire the technology at a later date, the investing firm can commit greater resources
when the technology is more promising (i.e. upon a decline in technological uncertainty and an
appreciation in the value of future discretionary investments). Any loss associated with
downward valuations in the technology is limited by the magnitude of the initial outlay, which
may equal the equity share invested and/or the "seed" money provided to the target for research;
an amount much smaller than the loss associated with outright acquisition. Investing firms may
either take a loss, by divesting its stock in the target, or it may maintain the equity stake, hoping
possibilities improve. Thus, like financial options, equity collaborations have considerable value
when the value ofthe underlying asset (i.e., in the case of this study, the asset is the technology) is
uncertain.
When would a finn be interested in having the "right" to acquire the target versus acquiring
the target outright? Financial option models, such as the Black-Scholes modeL have identified a
set ofvariables which critically influence the value ofa call option. Folta (1994) uses these
models to identifY five forces which influence the value ofthe option component in quasi-
integration: (1) technology value; (2) remaining cost of the target; (3) technological uncertainty
(volatility); (4) time until project completion; and (5) interest rates. Table 1 illustrates the
relationship between these variables and the value of the call option. It also shows the
corresponding variable influencing financial options.
6A COMBINED TRANSACTION COST - OPTION THEORY MODEL
As characterized by Folta (1994) and Folta and Leiblein (1994), the choice between
governance modes is critically detennined by two factors: transaction costs and option value.
Finns interested in accessing technology from a target are assumed to maximize utility (U) with
respect to alternative modes ofgovernance.
U (A,MI,JV) = j{Transaction costs, Option value) (1)
where A is acquisition, MI is direct minority investment, and JV is equity joint ventures.
The model becomes interesting when the value of the underlying technology is uncertain-
when option value associated with equity collaborations is significant. During such periods of
uncertainty, parties of the transaction are subject to bilateral dependency (Williamson, 1975). As
a result, the transactional efficiencies ofgovernance modes are strained, the farther they are away
from hierarchies. So, while option theory suggests that equity collaboration possess an advantage
relative to complete integration during periods ofuncertainty, transaction cost theory predicts that
complete ownership will be preferred. It has been shown, however, that option value will
dominate these opposing forces as uncertainty becomes significant (Folta, 1994; Folta and
Leiblein, 1994).
The model is likely to be affected significantly when transactions involve firms from different
countries. Ironically, complete ownership ofa foreign subsidiary invites considerable transaction
costs relative to equity-based collaborations (Gatignon and Anderson, 1988). The international
context ushers in two problems that play minor roles in domestic trading. The first involves
7culture differences; minority investments and joint ventures may be seen as a way ofbridging
cultural gaps. Kogut and Singh (1988) show that cultural distance decreases the probability that a
foreign direct investor in the U.S. would choose a fun acquisition. The second is political; equity
collaborations with local investors promise to reduce political complications while diversifYing
against expropriation risks. Both political and cultural problems reinforce the transaction cost
arguments for market mediation and weaken incentives to acquire firms in other countries.
Transactions between two firms in the same country should not be exposed to such problems.
In a domestic setting, option value is predicted to dominate the effect of transaction costs. As
a result, the individual variables associated with option values should be helpful in explaining
governance. This may not be the case when transactions involve firms across borders. A
preference for equity collaborations over acquisitions are a likely prediction from both transaction
cost theory and option theory. Since variables relating to transaction cost and option theory will
jointly explain governance, the marginal influence of the option variables should decrease in a
multinational context.
Hypothesis 1: The vector ofoption variables will be less significant in transactions
involvingfirms in different countries than in purely domestic transactions.
Hypothesis 2: The individual variables relating to option value to govemance decisions
will be less significant in transactions involvingfirms in different
countries than in purely domestic transactions.
8RESEARCH DESIGN
Sample
The biotechnology industry was chosen as a context for this study because of its recognized
importance and the rich mixture ofinstitutional arrangements for organization of the innovation
process. A sample of minority investment, joint venture, and acquisition transactions was drawn
from the North Carolina Biotechnology Center (NCBC) Actions Database. The NCBC Actions
Database includes information regarding over 4,000 transactions between firms world-wide from
1978 to mid-1993. Several criteria were used to eliminate transactions: (l) transactions
addressing biotechnology segments outside the scope ofthis study (the segments of interest
include Therapeutics, Diagnostics, Ag-Bio, and Suppliers); (2) minority investments and joint
ventures involving no R&D (manufacturing, distribution, or marketing agreements); (3)
transactions involving two established firms; (4) mis-coded or missing data; (5) transactions dated
before October 1984 and after December 1992; and (6) transactions involving academic or
government agencies. This procedure uncovered a sample of451 transactions between October
1984 and December 1992. At a later point, the sample was divided into two segments - domestic
and international.2
The dependent variable identifies the ith firmls choice ofaccessing thejth R&D project
through minority investment, joint venture, or acquisition. A minority investment is defined as an
2 Projectj was classified as domestic ifit involved two firms from the same country (eg. a transaction involved two
finDs from Switzerland, or two firms from the U.S.). Transactions involving two firms from different countries are
considered international. Table 2 exhibits the countries involved in the transactions and the number ofuansaction
which are domestic to that country, initiated with biotechnology firms in the U.S., or initiated with firms in
countries outside the U.S. 296 out of 451 trades were considered domestic.
9equity position in a finn less than 50%, while a joint ventures is the fonnation of a child finn by
two parent finns (one ofwhich is a biotechnology firm). These cases represent 36% and 10% of
the sample, respectively. Acquisitions are defined as the cumulative ownership of 50% or more of
a finn. This level of ownership gives the investor essential control of the firm. Equity
investments which pushed the cumulative ownership over 50% are identified as acquisitions.
Acquisitions represent 54% ofthe final sample.
The independent variables relate to transaction cost theory or option theory. The first
variable, Potential Partners relates to transaction cost theory.
Potential Partners. The availability ofpartners for project} at time t, in biotechnology
segment m, was measured by the number ofnew biotechnology £inns with R&D programs in
segment m at time t. J This measure should be appropriate because new biotechnology firms are
the primary source of technology in the industry (Office ofTechnology Assessment, 1984).
Annual data on the number ofnew biotechnology firms in each segment was available from the
Office ofTechnology Assessment (1984); and the Ernst & Young surveys (Bunill, 1987, 1989;
Burrill and Lee, 1990, 1991, 1992).
The number of partners increased annually from 1984 to 1992 for each segment: Therapeutic
(66 to 430); Diagnostic (66 to 317); AglBio (55 to 113); and Supplier (43 to 181). By
incorporating annual figures, this measure improves upon that used by Pisano (1989b).
J A common measure used to test the effects of "small numbers bargaining" is the four-firm concentration ratio
(Levy, 1985; Caves and Bradburd, 1988). Pisano (1989b) uses a measure nearly consistent with the measure used
in this study. It differs in that it does not vary by time.
10
Technology Value. This measure is designed to capture the value and the future promise of
the target's technology. Similar to Pisano (1989b), technology is characterized broadly as the
biotechnology segment in which the transaction takes place. Stock indices were developed for the
four largest biotechnology segments: Therapeutic, Diagnostic, AglBio, and Supplier. Each index
was created from weekly returns of nine U.S. firms dedicated to biotechnology and specializing in
the respective segments. The value of projectis technology was measured as the value of the
biotechnology index for segment m (when) E m) at the announcement ofthe project.
The four indices are meant to represent the distinct promise of each technology segment. It
was important, therefore, to identify a set of firms concentrating primarily in one of the four
segment. Since it is common for many biotechnology firms to be active in more than one
segment, every effort was made to select firms that operated in a relatively narrow technological
range, representative ofthe segment in which it focused. BioScan was used to identify publicly
traded firms, their range ofresearch activity, and their stated strategic focus.
Technological Volatility (Uncertainty). This measure is designed to capture the volatility
surrounding the technology of project}, in segment m. It has been common for researchers to
employ variance measures to estimate uncertainty. However, such measures have concentrated
on variance in revenues or demand in relatively mature industries. For young industries, such as
biotechnology, revenue and demand are not always reasonable alternatives. This study uses stock
market data to estimate volatility for the value of technology.
10
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Technological Volatility is calculated from the 26-week standard deviation of the log of
(inflation adjusted) weekly returns for each biotechnology segment index. Consistent with option
pricing models in finance, the following formula was used (Cox and Rubenstein, p. 254-8):
where,
( 1 ) 260":' = -_- x I:[(logR:)2 - J.l2]26 1 t=)
O"w = the unbiased estimate ofthe 26 - week volatility .
(2)
& = (% _J, represents the inflation - adjusted index price relative for week t.
(1) 26J.l = - x I:logR:.26 1=1
The 26-week measure was chosen because it was believed that volatility one-halfyear prior to
the transaction accounts for most of the influence on the governance choice decision.4 Figure 6.2
illustrates this measure over the life of the sample.
Because the announcement dates available for the transactions are monthly, a monthly
measure of annualized volatility (O'm)was calculated in the following way:
(3)
where, k equals the number of weeks in a month. S
4 A 52-week measure of technological volatility was also considered and tested. The coefficients for the 52-week
measure were generally less significant, supporting our choice of the 26-week measure.
5 While it is possible to calculate monthly volatility from monthly returns, that would compromise data points and




The formulation for this measure ofvolatility had implications for how the indices where
constructed. To assure that the measures ofvolatility were comparable across segments and
across time, each index contained nine firms throughout its life. The size of the indices (number
offirms) was constrained because biotechnology was a very young industry in 1984, with
relatively few public companies. Public companies were particularly rare in the AglBio segment.
As a result, we were limited by the population of public firms in that segment, and thus, in all
segments.
Project Duration. The option framework warrants a duration measure which approximates
the length of time until the option is exercised. Real options usually don't have exercise dates, but
instead have some time in the future when the option disappears because uncertainty is resolved.
The closer project j comes to commercialization, the more uncertainty is resolved surrounding an
R&D project.
Unfortunately, our data was not complete in identifying the research phase for every project;
therefore, making it difficult to estimate the time until project completion. However, since the
sample of transactions involves only R&D projects, it is believed that the projects were initiated a
relatively short time before the transaction occurred. Therefore, a relevant measure of duration is
the length of time from initiation ofprojectj until commercialization.
Our measure of duration is average length of time from research initiation to
commercialization for each segment m, to which project j belongs. The averages were gathered
from, and verified with, several sources, including OTA (1991), Burrill and Lee (1994), and Rossi
12
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(1992). The average project duration for therapeutics is 10 years, for diagnostics is 2 years, for
aglbio is 7 years, and for supplier is 1 year.
Interest Rate. This measure is the nominal risk-free interest rate at the time of initiation of
project j. It should influence the present value of the exercise of an option. Therefore, the
relevant risk-free rate for project} corresponds to the duration ofprojectj. Since therapeutic
projects have an estimated duration of 10 years, the average monthly yield on U.S. Treasury
Notes with a 10-year maturity was used for the month of project initiation. Likewise, the yield for
2-year Treasury Note maturities was used for diagnostic projects and the I-year Treasury Note
was used for supplier projects. Since data was not consistently available on maturities greater
than 10 years (except the 30-year Treasury Note), the 10-year Treasury Note yield was also used
for the AglBio segment. 6
Unrelated. This variable captures the difference in types offirms transacting in projectj. It is
a dummy variable, coded "I" ifa large, established firm transacted with a DBF or a joint venture,
"0" otherwise. Unrelated is meant to control for the types offirms involved in the transactions.
Transactions where Unrelated is coded" 1" involve firms that are vertically related, and those
transaction where Unrelated is coded "0" involve firms that are horizontally related.





Table 3 presents descriptive statistics for the dependent and independent variables in the
sample. The means for the dependent variable represent frequencies for each governance mode.
Since several of the independent variables were dummy variables, their means also represent
frequencies. 66.0% ofall transactions involve firms from the same country (Domestic), while
60.0% involve an established firm and a DBF or joint venture (Unrelated).
Ofthe remaining independent variables, several items are worth discussing. Potential Partners
and Technological Value have high variances relative to their means. This may be predominantly
explained by the positive skewness in these variables. Estimates of means and variance are highly
dependent upon the shape ofthe distribution; and in particular, the mean-variance combination
used to estimate the parameters behaves quite poorly when asymmetrical distributions are
involved. It is common to make distributions more symmetrical through transformations, which
do not alter the linear relationship, but provide a more sound basis for regression techniques
which summarize the relationship. Concave functions, such as natural logarithms, are
recommended for correcting right-skewed distributions (Neter, Wasserman, and Kutner, 1985).
Therefore, we have taken the natural logarithm of both Potential Partners and Technology Value.
Following this transformation, both the standard deviation and skewness are improved relative to
the mean value of these variables.
Technological Volatility is also skewed positively. This is not surprising given the high
volatility surrounding the stock market collapse beginning in October of 1987. As stated above,
these extreme values are likely to reduce any significant relationship in a regression model.
However, we are reluctant to transform this variable so that we may more closely approximate the
14
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variable used in the option-pricing models (recall that volatility is the most important variable in
pricing models). Furthermore, the standard deviation ofVolatility remains low relative to its
mean.
Methodology
The multinomiallogit methodology is appropriate for testing models where utility differences
determine the probability of selection among a series of discrete choices, and is employed in this
paper. The fundamental assumption underlying discrete choice modeling is the independence of
irrelevant alternatives (ITA). The ITA assumption requires that the ratio of the choice probabilities
of any two alternatives be unaffected by the systematic utilities ofany other alternatives. The
most widely accepted test of the validity of the ITA assumption has been developed by Hausman
and McFadden (1984). Initiation ofthis test reveals a Hausman statistic of3.882. This statistic
falls below the critical value at the 0.001 level indicating that the estimated coefficients are stable
across the choice set, thus providing statistical support for our trinomial specification.
RESULTS
The multinomiallogit model was estimated using LIMDEP version 5.1 (Greene, 1992). Table
4 illustrates the results from two different segments - domestic (column 1) and multinational
(column 2). Since the values of the independent variables did not differ across choice it was
necessary to normalize the values ofthe estimated coefficients to one of the governance choices.
The choice of the normalized variable has no effect on the model fit. Nor does it influence the
15
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significance of the relationships between dependent and explanatory variables. In this study, the
coefficients were normalized to the choice of acquisition. All other parameters can therefore be
interpreted only in reference to the acquisition choice. The significance of a coefficient indicates
the extent to which the corresponding variable contributes to the utility ofthat choice alternative
beyond the contribution that this variable would have in detennining the utility of the normalize
option. Consequently, the parameters explain deviation from the reference choice - acquisition.
Formal log-likelihood ratio tests were conducted to test the null hypothesis that the estimated
coefficients were jointly zero. These tests, reported in Table 4, compare the incremental
improvement in fit obtained in the theoretical model with respect to a null model [£(0)]. The test
statistic is X2 distributed with degrees of freedom equal to the difference in the number of
parameters in the models being compared. Both models are significant at the 0.001 level. A more
rigorous test of the significance of the explanatory coefficients is one that compares the fit of the
theoretical models with a constant-only model [£(c)]. This test was also conducted and is
reported in Table 4. Again, both models are significant at the 0.001 level, providing support for
the substantive coefficients in the theoretical model.
A test was performed to assess whether all the coefficients were equal across segments. The
likelihood ratio test revealed a test statistic of34.60 with 14 degrees offreedom. This value
exceeds the critical X2(O.Ol) value of29.14. Thus, we can reject the null hypothesis, and conclude
that the vector of coefficients is not equal across segments.
The main hypothesis argues that the vector of option coefficients will provide less explanatory
power when transactions are multinational, than when they are. domestic. To specifically examine
whether the option coefficients differed across segments, a second likelihood ratio test was
16
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perfonned. This test was perfonned by comparing the full model (pooled) with an unrestricted
model that is estimated with the full data set, but with a longer vector of coefficients in which the
vector ofoption coefficients are replaced with the market segment specific subsets of coefficients.
This test revealed a statistic of 17.32 with 6 degrees of freedom. Once again this statistic exceeds
the critical X2(O.Ol) value or 16.81. Thus, we can conclude that the vector ofoption coefficients is
different across segments, a result which supports hypothesis 1.
It is useful to know ifthe rejection of the joint hypothesis (all option coefficients are equal)
can be attributed to individual coefficients (Hypothesis 2). This was done by comparing
individual coefficients across the Domestic and International segments. The t-statistic is
appropriate for test whether differences exist, and is reported in column (3) ofTable 4.7 These
tests revealed several interesting findings. Volatility has a significantly greater influence (p <
0.001) on the choice ofminority investments over acquisitions for domestic transactions than for
international ones. No difference exists for the impact of Volatility on the preference for joint
ventures. In addition, domestic transactions involving both established firms and DBFs are more
likely than international transactions to prefer minority investments and joint ventures to
acquisitions. Interestingly, Project Duration has a greater influence among international
transactions on the preference for minority investments over acquisition. Thus, hypothesis 2 is
only partially supported.
7 The statistic for the asymptotic (-test of equality of individual coefficients between the domestic (1) and foreign




In general, these tests reveal that the vector ofcoefficients differs between domestic and
international settings. The impact of the option variables was shown to significantly differ across
segments. While the finding for Project Duration is puzzling, the findings for Technological
Volatility and Interest Rates are consistent with our expectations.
One alternative explanation for our findings may be that our measures may be inappropriate
for transactions outside of the U.S. Technology Value, Technology Volatility and Interest Rates
are U.S. - based measures. Of the 155 international transactions, 62 occurred without a u.s. finn
as the target firm. As a result, measures which are based on the technological and financial
environment in the U.S. may not be suitable. Nevertheless, it has been argued here, and
elsewhere, that the prominence ofU.S. biotechnology research suggests this index is
representative ofglobal biotechnology activity. Further work should attempt to verify this claim.
CONCLUSION
This study extends previous work tying option theory to governance decisions. It provides
evidence that the contribution of option theory differs acco'rding to whether transactions are
domestic or international. It should be noted that this study says nothing about the robustness of
option theory to different settings. Indeed, joint ventures and minority investments should contain
equally valuable, ifnot more valuable, options to acquire. This study does suggest, however, that
option theory provides a smaller marginal contribution to such settings because other
considerations, such as transaction costs will dominate. In addition, this study provides
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Option to ACQuire Technology
Value ofTarget's Technology
Cost ofTarget's Remaining
Shares and/or cost offuture
discretionary investments
Stock Price Volatility + Volatility ofTechnology's
Value
Time to Maturity + Time Until Project Completion
or Termination
Interest Rates + Interest Rates
Table 2: Countries Involved in Transactions
Country ofTarget Finn
Country of Domestic United Other
Acguirer States
Australia 3 3 0
Belgium 0 1 0
Brazil 0 1 0
Canada 14 4 2
Denmark 1 1 2
Finland 1 1 1
France 7 6 8
~~~ 0 8 5
Ireland 0 1 0
Israel 2 0 0
Italy 2 6 2
Japan 2 24 7
Netherlands 0 1 3
Norway 1 1 0
Singapore 0 1 0
Sweden 5 5 2
Switzerland 1 14 2
United Kingdom 10 15 3
United States 247 2S
Totals 296 93a 62
a This number does not include the 247 transactions
between !inns in the U.S.
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Table 3: Variable Definitions and Descriptive Statistics (451 transactions)
Variable Total Sample
0=451
Means Stet. Skew. Min Max
Dev.
Choice Variables
l. Acquisition and Merger 0.53
2. Minority Investment 0.37
3. Joint Venture 0.10
Independent Variables
1a. Potential Partners 221.97 105.48 0.43 43.00 430.00
b. log (potential Partners) 5.28 0.52 -0.36 3.76 6.06
2. Domestic 0.66 0.48 -0.66 0.00 1.00
3. Technological Volatility 0.33 0.12 1.10 0.14 0.72
4a. Technology Value 276.73 229.24 1.20 25.31 860.20
b. log (Technology Value) 5.26 0.90 -0.33 3.23 6.76
5. Project Duration 6.68 3.74 -0.52 1.00 10.00
6. Interest Rate 7.95 1.33 -0.39 3.30 11.86
7. Unrelated 0.60 -0.49 0.40 0.00 1.00
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Table 4: Multinomial Logit Parameter Estimates - Domestic versus International
Segments
Independent Variables Parameter Estimates
(nonnalized to acquisition choice) Domestic International t-testfor
(1) (2) differences (3)
Constant - specific to Minority -12.0716··· -4.4969 -1.7684 t
Investment (MI) (3.1420) (2.9112)
Constant - specific to Joint -3.0624 2.0155 -0.8734
Venture (N) (4.4361) (3.7580)





Volatility - MI 5.8678··· -0.3976 3.0336···
(1.5528) (1.3618)
-N 5.4165·· 2.8940 t 0.9379
(2.0576) (1.7319)
log (fechnology Value) - MI 1.3285·· 0.9815 • 0.5881
(0.4065) (0.4276)
-N 0.9371 0.9917 t -0.0661
(0.5856) (0.5829)
Project Duration - MI 0.0070 0.1163··
-1.9513 •
(0.0404) (0.0388)
-N 0.0657 0.0983 t -0.3871
(0.0637) (0.0551)
Interest Rate - MI 0.5634·· 0.3138 t 1.0391
(0.1717) (0.1680)
-N 0.3425 0.2023 0.4239
(0.2515) (0.2148)
Unrelated - MI 2.3512··· 0.4805 3.4614···
(0.3798) (0.3845)
-N 1.0589 t -0.7962 2.4944 •••
(0.5562) (0.4937)
Log-Likelihood Fit Statistic, £(p) -168.04 -183.07
d~ offreedom, df 14 14
-2[£(0) - £(13)] 206.63· ••• 82.09···
number of transactions 247 204
• •• *••tp<.10, p<.05, p<.OI, p<.OOI












PURDUE CIBER - 1993 WORKING PAPERS
Gordon M. Phillips, Robert J. Weiner
"Information and Normal Backwardation as Determinants ofTrading Performance: Evidencefrom the
North-Sea Oil Forward Market." 1994. The Economic Journal.
Stephen R. Goldberg, Frank L. Heflin
"The Association Between the Level ofInternational Diversification and Risk"
John A. Carlson
"Risk Aversion, Foreign Exchange Speculation and Gambler's Ruin"
John A. Carlson, Aasim M. Husain, Jeffrey A. Zimmerman
"Penalties and Exclusion in the Rescheduling and Forgiveness ofInternational Loans"
Kent D. Miller
"Industry and Country Effects on Manager's Perceptions ofEnvironmental Uncertainties. "
1993. .Journal oflntemational Business Studies, 24: 693·714.
Stephen R. Goldberg and Joseph H. Godwin
"Foreign Currency Translation Under Two Cases-Integrated and Isolated Economies"
Kent D. Miller
"A Comparison ofManagers' Uncertainty Perceptions and. Country Risk Indu:es"
Jon D. Haveman
"The Effect ofTrade Induced Displacement on Unemployment and Wages"
Jon D. Haveman
"Some Welfare Effects ofDynamic Customs Union Formation"
John A. Carlson, Insook Kim
"Central Banks' Expected Profits From Intervention
Ifyou would like to request copies ofspecific papers, please contact the Center for International Business Education and
Research, Purdue University, Krannert School ofManagement, West Lafayette, IN 47907.


















PURDUE CIBER· 1994 WORKING PAPERS
Casper G. De Vries, Phillip A. Stork, Kees G. Koedijk
"Between Realignments andIntervention: The Belgian Franc in the European Monetary System"
Casper G. de Vries, K. U. Leuven
"Stylized Facts ofNominal Exchange Rate Returns"
Kent D. Miller
"Operational Flexibility Responses to Environmental Uncertainties"
Kent D. Miller
"Economic Exposure and Integrated Risk Management"
Kent D. Miller
"Diversification Responses to Enviromnental Uncertainties"
John M. Hannon, lng-Chung Huang, Bih-Shiaw Jaw
"International Human Resource Strategy and Its Determinants: The Case ofMultinationals and Their
SubsidUzries in Taiwan"
John M. Hannon, lng-Chung Huang, Bih-Shiaw Jaw
"International Human Resource Strategy andControl: The Case ofMultinationals and Their
SubsidUzries"
John M. Hannon, Yoko Sano
"Customer-Driven Human Resource Policies and Practices in Japan"
John A. Carlson, Insook Kim
"Leaning Against the Wind: Do Central Banks Necessarily Lose?"
John A. Carlson, David W. Schodt
"Beyond the Lecture: Case Teaching and the Learning ofEconomic Theory"
Alok R. Chaturvedi, Hemant K. Jain, Derek L. Nazareth
"Key Information Systems Management Issues in Developing Countries: Differences in the Indian and
US Contexts"
Jon Haveman,
The Influence ofChanging Trade Patterns on Displacements ofLabor
Stephen Goldberg, Charles A. Tritschler, Joseph H. Godwin
Financial Reporting for Foreign Exchange Derivatives
Charles Noussair, Charles Plott, Raymond Riezman
Una investigacion experimental sobre ltz estructura del comercia interncional (Spanish Version)
Translated: An Experimental Investigation About the Structure ofInternational Commerce
Marie Thursby, Richard Jensen
Patent Races, Product Sumdards, and International Competition
Kent D. Miller, Jeffrey J. Reuer
Firm Strategy and Economic Exposure to Foreign Exchange Rate Movements
John Hannon, Yoko Sano






John Hannon, lng-Chung Huang, Cheng-Chen Lin
The Mediating Effect ofPrelPost Assignment Acitivities on the Quality ofWork Life ofExpatriates:
Evidence for Managers in the P.R.C.
John Hannon, lng-Chung Huang, Cheng-Chen Lin
The Mediating Effects ofOrganization Commitment and Job Involvement on the Relationship Between
Quality ofWork Life and Customer Service Attitudes
John A. Carlson, Marc Surchat
A Modelfor Filter-Rule Gains in Foreign Exchange Markets
Ch.N. Noussair, Ch.R. Plott, R. Riezman
The Principles ofExchange Rate Determination in an International Finance Experiment
Stephen R. Goldberg, Joseph H. Godwin, Myung-Sun Kim, Charles A. Tritschler
On The Determinants ofCorporate Hedging With Financial Derivatives
Ifyou would like to request copies ofspecific papers, please contact the Center for International Business Education and
Research, Purdue University, Krannert School ofManagement, West Lafayette, IN 47907.




PURDUE CIBER -1995 WORKING PAPERS
Timothy B. Folta
"Sovereignty Conditions and Governance Modes: An Option Theory Approtu:h"
John A. Carlson, Dong-Geun Han
"Monetary Coordination, Fixed Exchange Rates and Noisy Markets"
Jon D. Haveman
"Can Barriers to Trade Make a Differential?"
Ifyou would like to request copies ofspecific papers, please contact the Center for International Business Education and
Research, Purdue University, Krannert School ofManagement, West Lafayette, IN 47907.
(Phone: 317/494-4463 or FAX: 317/494-9658)
